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ABSTRACT
This article argues that the complexities of the Caspian Sea region
and of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline are only narrowly
understood and explained by the geopolitical literature. In an
attempt to address these shortcomings and to propose an
alternative reading of transnational infrastructures, the BTC
pipeline is revisited. Theoretically, the article uses insights from
functionalism to explain the three phases of the BTC project:
planning of the pipeline; construction of the pipeline; and, use of
the pipeline. The core argument made is that the BTC project is
much more than a power resource; it is the core medium of
interaction for international and regional actors (governmental,
non-governmental and intergovernmental) because of the
number of connections that it makes possible in a highly
contingent world. In contrast to Great Game assumptions, it is
argued that transnational infrastructures are not necessarily
negative or positive; rather, what is important is to view their
contribution, mixed impacts and limitations from a broader
perspective. In this sense, the article aims to situate the BTC
infrastructure within the wider political, economic and social
analyses of the Caspian Sea region.
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While the Caspian Sea (2004) region exhibits complex patterns of cooperation and conﬂict
at all levels, ranging from the local to the global, it is often depicted as a prime example of
a great powers’ arena due to its geographical location, rich natural resources and marked
regional disputes (e.g. Alam 2002; Iseri 2009; Kim and Eom 2008; Li-Chen 1999; Shirin
2004). By using mostly realist doctrines (power/security/state), the vast body of research
that exists on the Caspian Sea has framed highly complex infrastructure projects there
through only a one-sided and exclusively geopolitical lens. In so doing, the literature
has constantly used the metaphor of a “new Great Game” or “great power rivalry” to
describe competitive energy relations and how great powers – states such as the
United States, Russia, Iran, China and Turkey – may aﬀect power constellations and
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strategic decisions within the region (Jaﬀe and Manning 1998; Karasac 2002; Kober 2000;
Menon 1998).
In addressing Caspian Sea infrastructure developments, the literature focusses mainly
on the role of states (external and local powers) and portrays every issue (environmental,
technical, economic and social) from a purely geopolitical perspective (e.g. Iseri 2009; Kim
and Eom 2008; Kleveman 2003). Within this discussion, Russia, Iran and Armenia have been
identiﬁed as the main players behind every single issue or threat in the planning and con-
struction phases of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (Bayulgen 2009; Ismailzade
2006; Talbott 1997). In the same vein, the project was expected to trigger rivalry and
even war in the region following its construction (e.g. in Nagorno-Karabakh) (Bayramov
2016; Cohen 2002; Kim and Eom 2008). This understanding of the oil pipeline oﬀers,
however, the misleading impression that if there are natural resources, there will always
be conﬂict and rivalry (Bayramov 2018; Klare 2001).
Against this established backdrop, the article posits that it is not suﬃcient to think
about and scrutinise the BTC pipeline only in terms of rivalry and inter-state war.
Viewing the Caspian Sea as a geopolitical battleground obscures the important layers of
a more complex reality, as well as the underlying dynamics of material and non-material
interdependency. Drawing on insights from classical functionalism, the three deﬁning
phases of the BTC project are analysed: planning of the pipeline; construction of the pipe-
line; and, use of the pipeline. The article thus pursues three core objectives: It ﬁrst illus-
trates how during the planning phase there was great uncertainty with regard to the
amount of natural resources extractable and concerning the foreign policies of regional
states, which led to one-sided assumptions and exaggerations being made. Second, it
explains how challenges such as ﬁnancial, technical and social issues – beyond geopolitics
– blocked the project and led to signiﬁcant delays. In so doing, the article contends that
without this network of multiple actors it would have been impossible to overcome these
obstacles. Third and ﬁnally, the article explains the neglected role of the pipeline after its
construction. More concretely, the article shows that – against Great Game expectations –
the BTC pipeline has in a number of ways triggered functional and pragmatic cooperation
among the Caspian Sea littoral states.
I select the BTC pipeline as the case study here for three reasons. First, considering its
enormous economic, political, social and technical complexities, it represents one of the
largest forms of energy infrastructure ever seen – requiring some 28,000 workers and con-
suming a substantial amount of the world’s steel as part of its construction (British Pet-
roleum 2016). Second, it is the ﬁrst transnational project in the region since the end of
the Cold War, involving several diﬀerent countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey). Third, it
became operational in 2006, which makes it easier to analyse the long-term political
and economic outcomes of the infrastructure project as well as to observe new develop-
ments occurring in the Caspian Sea region. The BTC pipeline crosses Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Turkey to transport Caspian oil to Western markets. In this regard, the existing litera-
ture, has only discussed its long-term economic and political eﬀects on these three key
countries (e.g. Baran 2005; Frappi and Valigi 2015; Papava 2005). However, it is necessary
to look beyond just these three countries and to include in the analysis other Caspian Sea
states (e.g. Turkmenistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan) too as they also transport their oil
through the BTC.
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The article is divided into ﬁve parts. Following the introduction, the second section
selectively introduces insights from classical functionalism. The third section explains
the chosen methodology. The fourth and main section of the article discusses the ident-
iﬁed three phases of the BTC pipeline. Fifth and ﬁnally, the conclusion presents the article’s
ﬁndings and identiﬁes also its limitations.
2. Insights from functionalism
In order to establish the groundwork for the empirical part of the article, it is necessary to
ﬁrst selectively introduce the classical functionalist assumptions of David Mitrany (1966).
The reason for this selectiveness is that there are already a number of works in existence
that comprehensively address most principles of functionalism (e.g. Ashworth and Long
1999; Groom and Taylor 1975; Imber 2002; Rosamond 2005; Sewell 1966). Therefore, it
is unnecessary to walk the same pathways once again. The selected points include, ﬁrst,
that states are neither uniﬁed actors nor the only ones operating in the international
arena. Second, similar of problems challenge all sub-systems of the world alike, and indi-
vidual states or blocs of states produce common interests which in turn act as incentives
for seeking common solutions. Third, cooperation should be ﬂexible, self-determined and
pragmatic. Finally, transnational infrastructures should be viewed as mediating interfaces,
creating new burdens, greater interdependency and facilitating interaction capacities.
I choose classical functionalism as the theoretical approach here speciﬁcally because
the latest and updated liberal line of International Relations theories (e.g. regime theory,
institutionalism and multi-level governance) fail to cover a number of key aspects necess-
ary to explain the complex developments in the Caspian Sea. These fundamental aspects
are, however, addressed by classical functionalism, namely the technical emphasise on
material cooperation and material networks, as well as on taking non-state centric
approach. The relevant liberal literature views cooperation and integration mostly as a
set of intergovernmental treaties, the formation of institutions, formal and informal insti-
tutional agreements, diﬀerent policy levels as well as organisational frameworks. Neglect-
ing the material dimensions of cooperation, these theories fail to situate technical
cooperation, material networks, and technology in broader political, social and economic
analyses. However, taking into consideration the material and technological aspects, this
article integrates contributions from scholars who do not see themselves as working in the
functionalist tradition (e.g. Barry 2013a, 2013b; Coole 2013; Edward 2016; Latour 1996).
Only Petersen (2016) so far has used functionalism to explain the BTC project. Neverthe-
less, from an empirical perspective, Petersen (2016) covers only Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey, which overlooks the relationship between the littoral states. From a theoretical
perspective, Petersen falls into a common trap and judges the functional developments
in the Caspian Sea explicitly on the basis of a European benchmark. In this sense, he
expects European-style cooperation and integration without recognising the Caspian
Sea’s historical, political, economic, material and normative diﬀerences. This article does
not follow that European benchmark in discussing the Caspian Sea-style of cooperation,
and hence recognises instead the distinct set of political, economic and social goals
that are in play here.
First, compared to geopolitics, functionalism’s distinctiveness lies in its ability to able to
account for a more diverse array of actors (governmental, non-governmental and
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intergovernmental) (Rosamond 2005). It oﬀers both speciﬁc and broad theoretical impli-
cations to cover the preferences, role, network and power of actors above and beyond
just nation states. Multiple actors oﬀer the required resources that most states lack, such
as professional personnel, advanced technology, global networking, access to the world
market, security guarantees and ﬁnancial power (Forsgren 2008). In contrast to great
game expectations, functionalists assume rather the prevalence of pluralist politics with
multiple and diverse actors, who can and indeed do make contact and build coalitions
across national frontiers and national bureaucracies. In short, they do many of the
things traditionally – and exclusively – associated with the state (Mitrany 1966). Such a per-
spective is, in particular, conducive for understanding the involvement of multiple actors
as well as their modes of cooperation vis-à-vis common technical, political and economic
issues. The Caspian Sea region and the BTC project are subject to more complex and inter-
connected dynamics than pure high politics. To understand the complex enmeshment of
the Caspian Sea and the BTC, and to illuminate the full picture here, it is necessary to under-
stand also low politics. This theoretical perspective, therefore, is helpful to understand who
is behind these dynamics and how they talk about these developments.
Second, in contrast to geopolitics, functionalists have pointed out that not all games
between actors are zero-sum ones. Interaction is often better characterised as positive-
sum games, in fact. This approach is useful because it does not completely dismiss the
central aspect of rivalry between diﬀerent parties but rather seeks to draw a circle
around them. The main reason is that functionalism aims to ﬁrst establish mutual trust
between conﬂicting groups or search for possible alternatives. In this regard, functionalism
argues that cooperation between multiple actors should be ﬂexible and pragmatic
(Mitrany 1966). It is important to determine those activities that are common, where
they are common and the extent to which they are common. Also, actors are part of
these activities with respect to their interests and resources – and there should not be
an obligation to participate in all of the activities or contrariwise to stay out of them
(Mitrany 1966). This theoretical perspective is, in particular, helpful for understanding
the changing conditions and preferences of actors in the Caspian Sea region.
Third, functionalism situates technical cooperation in broader political, social and econ-
omic analyses (Rosamond 2005). The notion of a speciﬁc “technical sector” can be inter-
preted as “infrastructure” such as railways, telecommunications, roads, cables and
pipelines, which transcend national boundaries, connect a number of diﬀerent actors,
bring new restrictions and aﬀect interaction capacities. A technical sector is also self-deter-
mined, which means it ﬁxes its geographic scope, actors, organisational structure, inherent
nature, boundaries and power. For the objective of this article, this is a promising insight
since it considers complexity and the role of transnational infrastructure projects. Both
geopolitics and similar liberal lines of IR theorisation fail to include this fundamental
aspect, and thus to situate technical cooperation, material networks and technology in
those aforementioned broader political, social and economic analyses.
Unlike geopolitics, functionalism explains how technical issues encourage multiple
players to cooperate as these issues are beyond the political, economic and physical
capacities of any single actor to address (Mitrany 1966). More speciﬁcally, to build a trans-
national infrastructure requires important economic, political and technical investments.
Due to these costs and the matter of income generation, functionalism argues that
cross-national technical resources increase the burden of conﬂict in the region – which
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would make international disputes less beneﬁcial, less popular and ultimately less feasible.
States would think twice when thinking about starting a war with their neighbours (Oneal
et al. 1996). However it is important to highlight that cross-border infrastructures per se do
not necessarily prevent conﬂict; the condition of interdependency also has to be recog-
nised and understood by the concerned actors. If they are not aware of their interdepen-
dency, then conﬂict may still arise even when it is not in their best interest.
Finally, contrary to geopolitics, functionalism argues that technical cooperation
enhances the chances of material and non-material interdependency emerging
between diﬀerent actors. From a non-material perspective, transnational technical
resources require relaxed sovereignty principles, common rules, established management
strategies and ﬁrm regulatory frameworks (Henrich-Franke 2014). To realise these, actors
need to have regular meetings, joint studies and dialogue between politicians, experts,
the media and citizens, which will help them to learn about each other’s diﬀerent perspec-
tives, share their risks and deal with them accordingly. This might also increase socialisa-
tion among diﬀerent actors, and may lead to the creation of joint institutions to govern
transnational infrastructures. From a material perspective, meanwhile, technical resources
are mediating interfaces, as they allow people, things and signs to travel across space by
means of more or less standardised pathways and protocols for conversion or translation.
For example, Mitrany favoured the Universal Postal Union (UPU) because, as one of the
world’s global service organisations, the UPU brought diﬀerent actors together under
common rules, regulations and agreements for speciﬁc material exchanges –letters,
mail and parcels. For the purpose of this article, this theoretical perspective is particularly
beneﬁcial for explaining how the BTC has led to the establishment of material and non-
material interdependencies among diverse actors in the region.
However, there is still room for the enrichment of functionalism in certain areas. One
important enhancement would be to specify for whom something is functional, and to
what end. In other words, functionalism should be more actor and value speciﬁc (De
Wilde 1991). The literature has equated functionalism with “in service of humanity” or
“instrumental to the solution of a social problem” and not “in service of a ruling elite” or
“instrumental to a speciﬁc organisation and its bureaucracy”. Despite these shortcomings,
the functionalist insights oﬀer helpful tools for capturing the complexity of the BTC infra-
structure and the underlying logics of Caspian Sea cooperation. By using these function-
alist tools, this article will able to reveal the actors behind the BTC pipeline, their roles and
preferences, any common issues as well as the material and non-material functions of this
pipeline project in the Caspian Sea.
3. Methodology
This study is based on primary sources, interviews, ﬁeld research, scholarly journals, policy
documents, international reports, public debates resonating in the media as well as politi-
cal speeches and newspaper articles. Even though the article covers the time frame of
1994 to 2012, it is not a purely historical account of events. Twenty-two semi-structured
and in-depth interviews were conducted with local and international experts holding
diﬀerent positions within 14 regional and international institutions, individuals both
implicitly and explicitly involved in the BTC pipeline. The interviews were conducted in
two languages, English and Azerbaijani. The semi-structured interview model was selected
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because it is formal enough to ask the same set of questions, but suﬃciently ﬂexible that
ones spontaneously arising could also be worked into the conversational ﬂow (Bryman
2016; Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey 2011; Mosley 2013). By doing this, I could ask new ques-
tions that followed up on interviewees’ replies, and could vary the order of my queries. In-
depth interviews allow for listening to the experiences, interpretations and feelings of an
expert (Bryman 2016; Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey 2011).
I undertook two ﬁeld research trips in Azerbaijan, Baku. The ﬁrst from November until
December 2017, and the second in May 2018. Due to the limitations of time and
ﬁnancial resources, I conducted several Skype interviews with experts from Armenia,
Georgia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Turkey. Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes
each. During the interviews, I strived to type up the main points but I might have missed
certain peripheral ones. It is worth mentioning that for several reasons the data gathered
from these interviews is presented here anonymously (they were not recorded either).
The ﬁrst is conﬁdentiality, which was mutually agreed upon at the beginning of each inter-
view. Second, this approach protects respondents from retaliation for divulging potentially
controversial information. Third, it can encourage openness, as people often speak their
minds if they no longer have to worry about their statements coming back to haunt
them. Fourth, individuals were not speaking on behalf of their institutions and were
instead giving their personal opinion, making institutional aﬃliation less relevant. After
all interviews were transcribed and I developed a coding scheme using the qualitative
data analysis software, Atlas.ti.
In terms of challenges and limitations, there were certain hurdles to be faced during the
ﬁeld trips themselves as well. First, certain interviews reﬂected only the oﬃcial policy line
and therefore were not entirely useful or innovative. I was able to obtain innovative data
from a few interviews, nevertheless. Second, it was diﬃcult to gain access to certain gov-
ernment institutions – such as the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and the Ministry of Defence –
and certain questions required access to the top level of decision-making; therefore, most
interviews took place in a private or informal setting. In this sense, I could not access
experts from two Caspian states: namely, Kazakhstan and Russia.
4. Discussion: planning, construction and post-construction stages
4.1. Planning of the BTC pipeline
On 20 September 1994, after three and a half years of extensive negotiations, Azerbaijan
and a consortium of foreign oil companies signed a Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in
order to develop Azerbaijan’s Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) deepwater oil reserves – this
would later come to be known in the media as the “contract of the century”. Following
this, a number of pipeline routes were initially explored to transport the oil to international
energy markets – including one going east from the Caspian Sea to China, another
heading south to Iran and a further one extending the existing pipeline connections of
Baku–Novorossiysk.1 However, the economic sanctions imposed by the US on Iran, the
poor state of the existing Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline, and the fact that other routes
tended to terminate at the Black Sea and required oil to transfer through the Bosporus
(already congested with tanker traﬃc) together all resulted in preference for a route
through Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (Figure 1).
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The agreement was signed in Istanbul on 18 November 1999 by the presidents of Azer-
baijan, Turkey, Georgia and Kazakhstan in the presence also of the US president. This pipe-
line links Sangachal Terminal, situated on the shores of the Caspian Sea, to the Ceyhan
marine terminal, lying on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. The pipeline ﬁrst became oper-
ational in June 2006, being run by BP (Table 1).
4.1.1. Geopolitical uncertainty
From the very ﬁrst day of the BTC project’s existence, the Caspian Sea would be
described as a new geographical site of the Great Game (Jaﬀe and Manning 1998;
Karasac 2002; Kober 2000). By using nineteenth-century geopolitical thinking, the litera-
ture describes Russia and Iran as the main rivals to the development of any pipeline
here. On the other hand, the European Union and the US are described as saviours.
Normally, the Russians should not have taken any notice of relatively marginal
amounts of oil being produced by Azerbaijan. Russia’s overall production of the com-
modity is signiﬁcantly greater in volume – generating some 500–540 million tons of oil
(Henderson and Grushevenko 2017). Current BTC production does not even amount to
5 per cent of this output level. For example, according to BP, from 2006 until 2018 the
BTC pipeline carried just three billion barrels of oil to the Ceyhan marine terminal in
Turkey. Considering this, one may argue that neither Russia nor the other great
powers should worry about the amounts of oil produced in Azerbaijan. Why, then,
was the planning phase still mainly dominated by geopolitical assumptions and
exaggerations?
First, in the early 1990s as well as ﬁrst years of the new century a number of events
played a key role in creating the grounds for geopolitical uncertainty. For example,
Figure 1. Current pipelines from Azerbaijan. Source: The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR) (2018).
Note: Figure 1 includes three pipelines: the BTC, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline.
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because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the pipeline
route was not suﬃciently secure. Furthermore the legal status of the Caspian Sea was not
clear, and as such the littoral states were struggling to decide on it. Due to this uncertain
legal status, it was also diﬃcult to determine the ownership of several oil ﬁelds at sea –
namely, Araz, Alov and Sharg. Consequently, there was ongoing disagreement between
Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan as claimants.
Second, when reviewing the literature, newspapers and oﬃcial speeches published
throughout the 1990s, one realise that large amounts of scholarship were devoted to
predicting the Caspian Sea’s proven energy reserves – and, moreover, tended to cite
reserve ﬁgures that ranged from the optimistic to unrealistic (e.g. Alam 2002; Bahgat
2002; Jaﬀe and Manning 1998; Kim and Blank 2016; Ruseckas 2002). The most
Table 1. Timeline of the BTC Pipeline from 1994 until 2006.
Source: Sovacool and Cooper (2013, 111).
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commonly used estimate for the region’s oil reserves was 200 billion barrels, with no
distinction made between “proven” and “possible” reserves in the late 1990s. For
example, in July 1997 US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott described the
Caspian Sea oil reserves as being “as much as two hundred billion barrels of oil” (Kleve-
man 2003, 7). Later, US secretary of state James Baker would go even further: “Caspian
oil may eventually be as important to the industrialised world as Middle East oil is
today” (New York Times 1997). In the late 1990s, a number of academic articles only
strengthened these exaggerated assumptions. For example, Pipes argued that the
Caspian region holds “oil reserves estimated to be at least as large as those of Iraq
and perhaps equal to those of Saudi Arabia” (1997, 73). These exaggerations may
seem unimportant. But in some cases, particularly when the overly optimistic ﬁgure
of 200 billion barrels is wrongly compared to total global reserves of about one trillion,
it can enhance international attention paid to the region in the short term and unwit-
tingly cause subsequent conﬂicting understandings, deep suspicion about motives and
information struggles (Conca 2001).
By combining these exaggerated reserves with the events of the early 1990s, the
scholarship predicted unrealistic scenarios for the region. For instance, due to the uncer-
tain legal status and to the presence of potentially vast oil ﬁelds, international experts
argued that this dispute between the littoral states may eventually reach the point of
military means being used should it continue further (Haghayeghi 2003; Lelyveld
2001). Once Azerbaijani oil began to be exported to world markets in a stable
manner through the BTC pipeline, it was suggested that there existed a signiﬁcant
chance that Azerbaijan would begin a new war with Armenia (Bayulgen 2009; Kim
and Eom 2008). Along the same lines, Cohen argued that “supporting Armenia, Iran
or Russia could disrupt or sabotage the BTC pipeline” (2002, 5). Using outdated geopo-
litical assumptions, Dodds (2005) described the Caspian Sea basin as part of a gigantic
strategic triangle (along with the South China Sea and West Asia) that would come to
shape the patterns of potential (resource) wars in the twenty-ﬁrst century. In the early
years of the new millennium, Russian energy company Lukoil became one of the BTC
pipeline’s shareholders; it was thus claimed that it became part of this project due to
Russian political pressure. But, Lukoil quit the project in 2002 for economic reasons.
Naturally, it was again argued that Lukoil wanted to sabotage the project in selling
its shares (Ismailzade 2006).
Considering this, it can be concluded that in the early 1990s there was a tendency to
present every development through the lens of geopolitics and great power manoeuvring.
In using inaccurate information, much of the analysis that has been conducted is of
dubious standard – with facts being accepted without question, and used without
being subject to any semblance of academic rigour. Therefore, a false and misleading
image of the BTC pipeline in the modern Caspian Sea has been created. Such outdated
nineteenth-century geopolitical thinking is unavoidable, but awareness about it needs
to be raised as it leads to new insights regarding the shortcomings of dominant academic
and political practices. These examples show that according to the relevant literature, if
there are natural resources there will also be conﬂict and rivalry. But this is only one poss-
ible option; another is the opposite outcome, because cooperation might, in fact, also
emerge due to natural resources.
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4.2. Construction of the BTC pipeline
4.2.1. Challenges besides geopolitics
Throughout the construction phase, the pipeline faced a number of technical, environ-
mental and economic barriers, namely engineering failures, unstable oil prices and
social protests. The following section explains how these challenges inﬂuenced the devel-
opment of the project during that construction phase.
4.2.2. Technical challenges
The ﬁrst technical challenge faced was unexpected engineering failures. In 2004 a number
of consultant engineer companies reported problems with cracking in the pipeline due to
the coatings used in the Azerbaijani and Georgian sections of it (The Guardian, 17 Novem-
ber 2004). WorleyParsons, the lead independent consultant engineering ﬁrm involved in
the project, criticised the inaction of the BTC project management team, which had
allowed the problems to become greater than necessary. This issue increased the concerns
of international investors backing the pipeline. Among them, Banca Intesa (Italian Bank)
had expressed apprehension about the technical problems and later dropped the BTC
project completely for this very reason (Financial Times, 1 December 2004).
Similarly, the dispute over the signiﬁcance of SP-2888 coating2 became particularly
intense during the course of an enquiry by the United Kingdom Parliament’s House of
Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry into the activities of the UK govern-
ment’s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD). It was found that SP-2888 is not a
high-quality material, due to the technical issue of cracking and to a strong campaign
by human rights and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The UK Par-
liament devoted considerable time to the failed use of this material, and it also questioned
the involvement of BP and the ECGD in this project (Barry 2013, 143). SP-2888 was the
primary issue that was discussed in the House of Commons regarding this. After all, pro-
blems with the coating material could not be denied, and BP accepted that they had hap-
pened. Long sections of the pipeline had to be repaired as a consequence of the failure of
the coating material, which increased the overall cost of the project.
Additionally, harsh weather conditions and unexpected archaeological ﬁndings created
further technical challenges. The BTC pipeline corridor climbs gradients as high as 3,000
metres steep in some places, and is almost 200,000 kilometres long – with increased
pressure being required to move oil up and down inclinations and slopes (Pipeline and
Gas Journal 2006). It was argued that unexpected snowstorms and harsh weather con-
ditions made some parts of the pipeline inaccessible for up to four months, which
accounted for delays at an extra cost of USD 270 million (Pipeline and Gas Journal
2006). Finally, once construction began contractors encountered more archaeological
sites and unexplored places along the pipeline route than the planners had anticipated
– which also led to delays and extra technical work and ﬁnancial costs.
Considering these technical challenges, it can be argued that it was not Russia, Iran or
Armenia but the issues themselves that led to signiﬁcant delays during the construction
process – and meanwhile increased the overall cost of the BTC project. These underesti-
mated technical issues forced the UK Parliament to question its economic and political
support for the pipeline. In this regard, the project would never be completed if one of
the powerful members of the EU withdrew its support for it.
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4.2.3. Economic barriers
The pipeline project additionally faced a multitude of economic hurdles. During the plan-
ning stage, project sponsors assured the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey
that the BTC pipeline would cost approx. USD 2.1 billion; then it was increased to USD 3.6
billion, while in the end it came to cost approximately USD 4 billion to build (BP Report
2012). Sovacool and Cooper (2013) argue that much of the cost overruns resulted from
underestimating the expense of environmental and social impact assessments. In the
year 2000 three members of the consortium – Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Penzoil – withdrew
from the project for economic reasons. As mentioned earlier, Italian investor Banca Intesa
also pulled out of the consortium in 2004, which led to construction delays and extra
ﬁnancial outlays. Following this event, the head of SOCAR said delays to construction
work on the project could increase its costs by about USD 400 million. It is important to
note that every day of delay cost BP potential oil revenues (Pipeline and Gas Journal
2006). Additionally, in 2004 the price of oil was less than USD 40 per barrel, creating
pressure to complete the project before the commodity’s value bottomed out entirely
(OECD Data 2018).
Another economic challenge was the land acquisition and compensation process for
the BTC pipeline. To address this process and its impacts, the BTC project needed a com-
prehensive and well-structured programme. However, according to an International
Finance Cooperation (IFC) report: “BTC contractors underestimated the scale and complex-
ity of the land acquisition process and how much lead time and resources this would
require in countries where land registration systems and land records were weak or
non-existent” (2006, 19). Hence in many cases the BTC project had to start from scratch,
initiating land survey work and identifying thousands of rights holders – which ultimately
took considerably longer than originally anticipated and therefore induced additional
spending requirements and construction delays. Because of these economic issues, the
BTC pipeline ended up costing, as noted, USD 4 billion. Considering Azerbaijan’s and Geor-
gia’s weak economy at the start of the new century, it can be argued that these extra econ-
omic costs created an acutely diﬃcult situation for them. Other international partners
questioned the proﬁtability of the project due to these issues. To attract new investors
to it was also not easy as Azerbaijan and Georgia were considered too risky due to their
own regional conﬂicts and internal issues.
4.2.4. Social and environmental challenges
Throughout the construction phase, active protests by a number of NGOs and environ-
mental grassroots movements were another core challenge that the BTC project stake-
holders had to confront. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth, Kurdish Human
Rights Project and CEE Bankwatch were staunchly opposed to the pipeline project. They
sent letters to high-proﬁle members of the World Bank and BP, and organised protests
at the oﬃces of the European Bank for Construction and Development (EBRD) (Carroll
2009). In August 2002, a coalition of NGOs released a series of fact-ﬁnding reports
based on investigative missions to Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, excoriating the
project for the threat that the pipeline’s construction and operation posed to both
human rights and the environment (e.g. risks of oil spill and loss of biodiversity)
(Amnesty International 2003; Carroll 2012; Molchanov 2011). In 2004, Tamar Libanidze,
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Georgian environment minister, halted the construction of the Borzhomi section in that
country due to these environmental risks (Burton 2004).
Another barrier was social protests. The BTC venture was hit by worker discontent in
2004: labourers in both Azerbaijan and Georgia argued that the companies involved in
the laying of the pipeline were engaging in unfair workplace practices. On 28 February
2004, about 400 workers employed by the Greek-based Consolidated Contractors Inter-
national Co. went on strike in the Kurdamir District of Azerbaijan, due to perceived
social injustice and discrimination both in terms of wages and ethnicity (Appelbaum
2004). These protests played a signiﬁcant role in slowing down the project, increasing pol-
itical attention and raising expenditure on it.
Above all, these examples illustrate the central role of technical, economic and environ-
mental issues – which increased the costs of the project, led to delays, gave rise to inves-
tigations and, indeed, almost put an end to it entirely. Considering these challenges, one
may argue that it was not Russia, Armenia or Iran but one of the BTC pipeline’s key stake-
holders, Georgia, who blocked the pipeline’s construction because of environmental
issues. In the same vein, it was one of the core Western supporters of the project, the
UK, who investigated and questioned the involvement of BP and ECGD in the project
for their technical and material failures. Finally, the project was delayed by the mass pro-
tests of workers, NGO pressure and by land acquisition matters. The project was halted
because people protested against their measly salaries and harsh work conditions; none
of the great powers of the region pushed them to do this. These neglected material
and non-material issues created obstacles for the BTC project, threatened its success
and increased the overall cost from USD 2.1 billion to USD 4 billion. From a functionalist
perspective, these examples also indicate that political agreement is not the only decisive
condition for the realisation of complex infrastructure. Rather, non-political requirements
also need to be fulﬁlled.
4.2.5. Network of multiple players
These combined technical and geopolitical challenges have produced an environment
where Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey must now rely on the involvement and coordi-
nation of multiple actors, namely international NGOs (INGOs), NGOs, ﬁnancial institutions
and transnational corporations (TNCs). As explained in the theory section, the presence of
two or more actors in transnational infrastructure can reduce serious ﬁnancial, political and
security risks – which such projects often encounter. This section illustrates, therefore,
exactly how a network of actors with varying interests created systematic and functional
coordination in the context of the BTC project.
4.2.6. Oil companies
One of the key actors herein are multinational oil companies, such as BP, Chevron, SOCAR,
Inpex and Statoil Hydro, who between them oﬀered a number of the required resources to
transport landlocked oil to international markets. Due to their economic power, oil com-
panies’ investments are a strategic source of revenue and a key input to the budgets of
the countries of the region. For instance, because of economic troubles related to the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s economic growth contracted by
almost 60 per cent between 1990 and 1995 (Sovacool and Cooper 2013). The Azeri and
Georgian governments were therefore very receptive to earning substantial transit
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revenues from a possible pipeline, and they were willing to do their best to attract the par-
ticipation therein of international oil companies (Kalyuzhnova 2008). According to one
interviewee, “in the 1990s, Azerbaijan was willing to accept a ceaseﬁre with Armenia to
create a safe investment environment for international oil companies. In light of this, Azer-
baijan was able to attract crucial energy companies to the pipeline project”.
The BTC is owned and operated by a consortium of 11 international oil companies,
being managed overall by BP (BP 2017). In the early 1990s, forming such a consortium
was not easy for companies since they were also in competition with each other during
the tendering and negotiation phase of the BTC pipeline. One of the key issues was
whether and if so how to include Russian energy companies. Nevertheless, Western
energy companies were aware that the ﬁnancing, resources and political realities in the
Caspian Sea region required working together. Therefore, they sought to accommodate
Russia by giving Lukoil a 10 per cent stake – as the success of their project depended
on good relations with Russia (Edwards 2003). Overall, the involvement of these compa-
nies contributed to economic growth in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey by providing a
substantial new revenue stream. They helped the regional countries to establish unprece-
dented commercial links with the rest of the world.
Besides their economic leverage, the involvement of Western energy giants comes with
political and security advantages too. They put Azerbaijan and Georgia on the map in
terms of attracting foreign direct investment and gaining Western support for their sover-
eignty, resolving territorial conﬂicts and for ensuring security. For example, according to a
local expert in Baku, “due to the involvement of international oil companies, some Western
countries (for example, the UK and the US) have paid more attention to the region’s
conﬂicts”. This attention was very important for Azerbaijan and Georgia, as it could help
them to keep up diplomatic negotiations and prevent further violent clashes. Additionally,
one interviewee mentioned that the “active involvement of TNCs oﬀers extra security to
the BTC because it is the property of both Azerbaijan and the West”.
In addition, BP has implemented signiﬁcant security measures along the energy route,
mainly in the form of patrolling and monitoring. An expert from the company said that
although protection of the pipeline is ultimately the responsibility of the relevant govern-
ments, BP is involved in addressing this security matter with its own measures too – such
as providing advance technology, training guards, implementing social projects, and
oﬀering ﬁnancial support. In Azerbaijan, BP has implemented facility protection and secur-
ity guard services through its private security provider, Titan D, while closely cooperating
with the Export Pipeline Protection Department – the Azeri government agency appointed
for infrastructure security. Besides these measures, BP has also launched several social pro-
grammes (e.g. repairing roads, supporting agriculture, educational initiatives etc.) along
the pipeline’s route to support local villages and gain their support. According to a repre-
sentative of the company, in this way BP can cooperate with local people and they inform
government oﬃcials in advance about any terrorist or sabotage plans. Table 2 below out-
lines the states, companies and private lenders involved in the BTC project.
Finally, the exploitation and transportation of oil from the Caspian Sea would not be
possible without modern technology, which the regional states lack. In this sense, the con-
sortium companies revitalised the technical capacities of Azerbaijan by oﬀering advanced
oil and gas processing plants and fabrication facilities. They contributed to the upgrading
of local experts’ knowledge by oﬀering a number of educational and capacity-building
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training programmes. In line with the theoretical proposition of this article, BP’s contri-
bution to the BTC project illustrates, therefore, that it oﬀers many of the things that
regional states lack and were not otherwise able to attain. It is, however, important to
note that by involving themselves in the project, these companies have also beneﬁtted
signiﬁcantly from it – by adding new reserves to their resource bases, by exploiting vast
natural resources for signiﬁcant proﬁt and by diversifying their portfolios away from
reliance on ﬁelds in Alaska, the North Sea and South America.
4.2.7. Coordination with the World Bank Group: EBRD, IFC and private banks
Despite the heavy investment of BP and other energy companies, covering all of the costs
for this massive project has still required funding also by international banks and ﬁnancial
INGOs – such as the World Bank, the IFC, the ECGD as well as the EBRD. Ensuring sound
coordination between them was decisive to securing sustainable funding and reducing
attendant political risks. Nevertheless, in the years from the end of the Cold War into
the new century the regional countries lacked crucial lobbying and networking experi-
ence. Furthermore, ones like Azerbaijan and Georgia were – as noted earlier – considered
too risky for international banks and ﬁnancial institutions to invest in. As such, one inter-
viewee noted that:
By using their access to global donor networks, the consortium companies – particularly
BP – facilitated relations between Azerbaijan and ﬁnancial institutions: the World Bank,
EBRD, ECGD, EXIM Bank and IFC. BP has played a key role in all stages of the BTC
project since the 1990s. It is one of the strong and popular European energy companies,
and its involvement attracts other Western ﬁnancial institutions and gives them more
security and reliability.
These global ﬁnancial institutions invested in the BTC pipeline as a way of helping Azer-
baijan, Georgia and Turkey graduate to the global economy (Petersen 2016; Sovacool
2010; Sovacool and Cooper 2013). For example, EXIM Bank was only one of seven
countries’ export credit agencies involved in ﬁnancing the project. From 2003 to 2005,
EXIM Bank had to approve ﬁnancing of up to USD 160 million to help complete the
project (Bashir 2017). The IFC provided an overall investment expenditure of USD 250
million for the development of the BTC pipeline. Additionally, in 2003 the EBRD approved
a 12-year loan of up to USD 125 million for the BTC project itself and syndicated a 10-year
USD 125 million loan to commercial lenders (Pyrkalo 2016). In December 2003, the ECGD
approved a line of credit for the project of USD 450 million (GBP 81,703,893). According to
Table 2. Actors.
Source: Authors own compilation.
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Barry (2013), the involvement of the ECGD in the project was intended to reduce the
ﬁnancial risk to investors – but also helped to ensure that the UK government in particular
would have a direct interest in the eventual completion of the project.
Additionally, governments that received loans from the World Bank and other ﬁnancial
institutions are obliged to implement a package of reforms (relating to environmental,
technical and economic standards). Considering the pressure coming from diﬀerent
NGOs, these organisations worked with the BTC consortium companies and three govern-
ments to help with land resettlements, fostering local businesses and ensuring environ-
mental compliance. To optimise Azerbaijan’s management of its resource wealth, the
World Bank Group advised the Azerbaijani government on the creation of the State Oil
Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). To promote transparency, the Group facilitated the country’s
participation in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI); Azerbaijan would,
however, leave this institution in 2017, due to its human rights demands. International
oil companies and ﬁnancial institutions together helped Azerbaijani and Georgian
energy companies to transform from Soviet-era entities into more transparent, modern
state-owned enterprises (Petersen 2016).
After becoming involved in the BTC, these actors oﬀered their strong networks to help
attract further ﬁnancial support (private banks) and to mitigate any political risks. Never-
theless, and as pointed out earlier, it has been argued that “the private capital markets
were not willing to loan to countries like Azerbaijan and Georgia because they are too
risky” (Sovacool and Cooper 2013, 118). However, this situation changed thanks to the
strong networks of the EBRD and IFC – who were able to guarantee the cheap lending
of ﬁnancial products to Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The two countries utilised these organisations’ vast network of ﬁnancial, social and
environmental experts to ensure the minimisation of costs and maximisation of assets.
They played the much-underappreciated role of risk mitigators in the process of opening
up the Caspian Sea’s riches, assisting in attracting the private leaders of the ﬁnancial
world – including Citibank, ABN Amro and Societe Generale – to help ﬁnance the remaining
(minor) outstanding amounts (Carroll 2012). In line with the theoretical proposition of this
article, this example illustrates that the power of actors rests in large part on their access to
global donor and technical assistance networks that regional actors may not be able to
otherwise reach (Mitrany 1966). The export credit agencies and bilateral ﬁnancial insti-
tutions of the US, the UK, Japan and others teamed up with the EBRD and IFC to lend
more than just a hand. In total, the funding model proposed put up USD 1.7 billion of
public money for the project in a 70/30 debt/equity structure (Carroll and Jarvis 2014). It
has been claimed that 70 per cent of the project costs were funded by a group of
lenders that included the World Bank Group’s IFC, EBRD, the export credit agencies of
seven countries as well as a syndicate of 15 commercial banks (IFC September 2006).
These empirical ﬁndings reinforce the functional proposition that technical issues are
beyond the political, economic and physical capacities of any individual actor to solve –
thus requiring the involvement of multiple players. In line with this, it can be argued
that the BTC project would not have been completed in a timely manner if a number of
diﬀerent actors were not part of the project. They pooled their resources to deal with
speciﬁc issues. The legitimacy and supervision provided by INGOs like the World Bank
Group and by private companies were critical to securing public recognition and
support from the US and the EU governments for the project (Petersen 2016). Although
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the regional countries are still witness to weak rule of law, endemic corruption and limited
institutional capacities as well as transparency, these actors between them ensured that
ultimately the BTC pipeline was successfully built according to certain Western standards.
4.3. Use of the pipeline: pragmatic cooperation and regional conﬂicts
When addressing the BTC project’s socio-economic impact, the existing scholarship
focusses mainly on the trilateral relationship between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey
or, alternatively, competition between the littoral states (e.g. Bayulgen 2009; Dikkaya
and Ozyakisir 2008; Frappi and Valigi 2015; Mammadyarov 2007). However, despite the
diverse literature on show, less research has been done explaining how the BTC pipeline
has led to cooperation among the Caspian Sea states since its construction.
4.3.1. Pragmatic cooperation
Unlike the geopolitical assumptions, which predicted naval conﬂict and rivalry, the Caspian
Sea countries actually started to show keen interest in the BTC route following the success-
ful completion of the project. The ﬁrst such example of cooperation is Turkmenistan, which
from July 2010 onwards started to transfer its oil through the pipeline. Despite the lack of
consensus between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the Azeri–Cirag–Kepez oil ﬁelds –
which the great powers literature argued may eventually lead to (naval) warfare between
the two countries – the BTC pipeline has, in fact, provided these two countries with the
opportunity to enhance their cooperation. According to BP Azerbaijan, the pipeline is
capable of handling some 800,000 barrels per day and Turkmen oil accounts for 4–5
per cent of this ﬂow volume (Radio Free Europe, 12 August 2010). For example, 371,206
tons of Turkmen oil were transported via the BTC pipeline in June 2016 alone (Ismailova
2016). Since there is no pipeline connection between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, oil
is brought to Baku aboard tankers. By joining the BTC pipeline, Turkmenistan has diver-
siﬁed its oil export options to include one that does not pass through Russia and has
also secured access to international energy markets through an alternative route. These
days, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are furthermore in the process of discussing the trans-
portation also of Turkmen gas to Europe through the “Southern Gas Corridor”.3
As a second example, on 16 June 2006 Kazakhstan oﬃcially joined the BTC project – for
which an agreement was signed in Almaty by the presidents of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
(Radio Free Europe, 16 June 2006). Due to the absence of an existing pipeline between the
two countries, Kazakh crude oil is shipped to Baku across the Caspian Sea and then
pumped through the 1,770-kilometre-long BTC one to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan. Following this, in November 2008 the national energy companies of Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan concluded an agreement with respect to the development of a Trans-
Caspian oil transport system to help get Kazakhstani oil to international markets (The
Moscow Times 2008). The network would be initially able to ship 500,000 barrels of oil
daily (23 million tons a year), eventually increasing to 750,000–1.2 million barrels per
day (35–56 million tons annually). The new Trans-Caspian oil transport system agreement
and the commodity’s shipment via the BTC pipeline indicate that, despite some disagree-
ments over transit tariﬀs and the use of Black Sea terminals, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are
willing to cooperate on moving the latter’s oil – and that, moreover, Kazakhstan is keen to
174 A. BAYRAMOV
improve its export capacities and is looking for options vis-à-vis diversifying export routes
(Guliyev and Akhrarkhodjaeva 2009).
Kazakhstan has still managed to restore the pumping of hydrocarbon resources via the
BTC pipeline, but not the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) project. The
Tengizchevroil company provides for an annual exportation of four million tons of oil
via Azerbaijan, of which three million should be transported speciﬁcally via the BTC pipe-
line (Parkhomchik 2016, 143). According to the Azerbaijani State Statistics Committee, over
6.53 million tons of transit oil (from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) were pumped through
the BTC pipeline in 2018 (Caspian Barrel 2016, 27 April 2018).
Furthermore, a week before Kazakhstan oﬃcially committed to the pipeline an Iranian
oﬃcial said Tehran wanted to explore the BTC export option too. According to Mahmoud
Khagani, the chief of the Caspian Sea Department of the Iranian Oil Ministry “we are cur-
rently exploring for oil in the southern Caspian Sea. Our relations with Azerbaijan have
been developing so successfully that, if we get positive results in the southern Caspian,
we could discuss possible cooperation” (Eurasianet, 18 July 2006). Although this aim
was not fulﬁlled due to reasons of it being commercially unproﬁtable and of limited
natural resources in the southern section of the Caspian Sea, this political statement illus-
trates that Iran was also keen to seek new options regarding reaching Western energy
markets. In 2018 Tehran and Baku discussed the possibility of establishing a joint oil
company for the exploration of natural resources in the Caspian Sea (Reuters 2015;
Trend, 15 May 2018).
Finally, in 2009 Russia’s largest oil producer, Rosneft, became interested in options to
export oil through the BTC pipeline. Rosneft’s president, Sergei Bogdanchikov, told the
press: “If the project meets the economic interests of both sides, naturally we will be
able to export our oil through the BTC” (Azernews, 23 September 2009). In response to
this, Rovnag Abdullayev, president of SOCAR, said: “If an appeal is received, it may be con-
sidered, and even its realisation in the future is possible” (Azernews, 23 September 2009).
However this idea has, to date, ultimately not moved beyond abstract statements, because
it is argued that the BTC pipeline is economically less appealing for Russia (Daly 2014).
Despite this, negotiations have continued between SOCAR and Rosneft from time to
time (Antidze 2014). Moreover, in 2014 Lukoil showed interest in transporting its oil via
the BTC pipeline. Later that company announced, on 16 May 2014, that its oil would
soon be delivered to Europe via the BTC pipeline (Caspian Barrel, 18 May 2014). In the
same month Lukoil delivered a trial batch of 30,000 tons of oil via the pipeline. For econ-
omic reasons, it started to transport Russian crude oil and condensate (Lukoil) in 2018
(British Petroleum 2018; BP First Quarter 2018 Results). Since it constitutes a commercial
secret, uncovering the exact amount of transported Russian oil is not possible. During
my ﬁeldwork interviews, a local expert from Azerbaijan posited that Lukoil intends to
transport approximately 500,000 tons of oil this way.
These empirical ﬁndings reinforces the theoretical proposition that post-construction
the transnational BTC infrastructure has changed the dynamics of the Great Game in
the region, by oﬀering a functional system for pragmatic cooperation. It is indeed true
that infrastructure becomes “strategic” because of the number of connections that it
makes possible in a highly contingent world (Latour 2005). In this regard, the completion
of the BTC pipeline has changed the preferences of the Caspian Sea states, enhanced
regional interaction capacities and connected landlocked countries to both global and
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regional networks. Existing uncertainty and hostility have decreased to some extent, which
has furthermore enhanced the interest of the littoral states in the project. Cooperation
between them is occurring because all three stand to beneﬁt from it, as each possesses
a resource that the other two lack of their own. Both energy and transport are valuable
enterprises that promise to bring ﬁnancial reward. It is a pragmatic, ﬂexible and techno-
cratic cooperation unfolding, as the littoral states can be part of these activities with
respect to their interests and resources and there is no an obligation to either participate
in the project or to stay out of it.
Having said all this, it is worth noting that the downside of infrastructural cooperation is
that it is set up to exploit speciﬁc natural resources or geographic places. In this case, Baku
is one of the few sites to have been exploited in this context. Due to this fact, it is the
Caspian Sea capital cities that constitute themain beneﬁciaries of ensuing economic devel-
opment, while other ones are ignored andmiss out. Therefore, such cooperation could also
eventually lead to the exploitation of the periphery rather than to its development.
5. Conclusion
This article has challenged the Great Game visions that depict transnational infrastructure
as one of the core sources of geopolitical rivalry and conﬂict in the Caspian Sea region.
Drawing instead on insights from classical functionalism, it has been argued that the
BTC pipeline should not be viewed in isolation; rather its complexity and sophistication
need to be fully taken into consideration. This is because, ﬁrst and foremost, the BTC
project is not just made up of metal pipes and oil, but also of the extensive legislation,
logistics and state and non-state authorities that also all help support it. The BTC pipeline
has brought multiple actors together, connected national borders, increased the cost
burdens of regional conﬂict and altered the structure and landscape of the Caspian Sea
region.
By using tools from functionalism, the article has explained the three phases of the BTC
pipeline project: planning of the pipeline; construction of the pipeline; and use of the pipe-
line. The article, ﬁrst, showed that the planning phase was dominated by geopolitical
assumptions due to the exaggeration of the extent of natural resource reserves as well
as to political, economic and technical uncertainties. This enhanced international attention
given to the region in the short term, and also unwittingly caused subsequent conﬂicting
understandings of it, deep suspicion about motives and information struggles. Thus, a
false image of the region has been created.
Second, it has been illustrated here that geopolitical arguments do not reveal the full
picture when it comes the BTC project. By discussing the construction phase, the article
has shown that analysing related challenges (e.g. environmental, technical economic
and social) is an inadequate approach when it comes to Russia for example. Despite
geopolitical predictions, it was not Russia or Iran – rather, neglected crucial technical,
social, environmental and economic issues – that created obstacles for the project
and increased the costs of it, and thus led to lengthy delays, the launching of investi-
gations and almost, indeed, the halting of it entirely. During the construction phase,
one of the BTC pipeline’s key stakeholders, Georgia, blocked the project because of
environmental issues. Its one of the western supporters, the UK, investigated and ques-
tioned the involvement of BP and ECGD in the project vis-à-vis technical and material
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failures. Finally, the project was delayed due to massive protests by workers, NGO press-
ures and land acquisition disputes. Contrary to state-centric Great Game assumptions,
these issues were resolved due to the systematic support and networking of multiple
players – namely, transnational energy companies, intergovernmental organisations
and international banks. Considering the strong ﬁnancial, political, technical and lobby-
ing support they gave, it can be argued that the BTC would never have been completed
without it.
The article has, ﬁnally, shown the neglected role of the BTC pipeline post-construction.
Despite a number of geopolitical disputes and uncertainties, since its construction the
pipeline has changed the dynamics of the Great Game in the region. More precisely, it
has led to non-calculative cooperative behaviour and oﬀered a functional way of pursuing
pragmatic collaboration and exchange between the Caspian littoral states. The BTC infra-
structure has become strategic because it oﬀers the littoral states possibilities of contrac-
tual and material integration as well as adherence to international standards as alternative
routes forwards to the unrealistic one of political integration, which helps them bypass
thorny issues of nationalism, political diﬀerence and sovereignty while still creating
material interdependence in the long run. In this regard, the BTC pipeline has created suit-
able conditions for pragmatic, ﬂexible and technocratic cooperation – as the littoral states
can be part of these activities with respect to their interests and resources while there is no
obligation either to participate in the project or to stay out of it. Despite the long-standing
issues existing between the littoral states, such as the uncertain legal status and contested
nature of resource ﬁelds when it comes to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for example, the
BTC pipeline has created room to circumvent these restrictions while still addressing issue-
speciﬁc needs. Considering this, it can be argued that it is necessary to determine those
activities which are common, where they are common and the extent to which they are
common.
In terms of further research, this article has focused only on particularly salient issues in
the three phases of the BTC project that others previously left unscrutinised. The down-
sides of infrastructural cooperation – for example, exploiting only speciﬁc natural
resources or failing to develop the periphery – could not be discussed here. Another
road forward comes from the generalisability of ﬁndings. The BTC pipeline is a speciﬁc
case, one in which pragmatic and issue-speciﬁc cooperation can be observed. When
using the same analytical structure (planning, construction and eventual use of infrastruc-
ture), scholars should now consider also regional diﬀerences. Overall, the research ﬁndings
point towards a more cautious approach needing to be taken in evaluating the Caspian
Sea region. They also complements a growing empirical literature in IR that deals with
the role of infrastructure and technology in generating cooperation (e.g. Barry 2013;
Latour 2005). More concretely, the ﬁndings of the article invite the IR literature to
engage in a broader debate about the mutual relationship between infrastructure, tech-
nology and cooperation.
Notes
1. The Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline is a 1,330-kilometre long oil one, running from Sangachal
Terminal in Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk Terminal on the Black Sea coast, in Russia. The pipeline
ﬁrst became operational in 1997.
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2. Used for coating girth welds, as well as valves, ﬁttings, pipes, ballast tanks, ships and marine
structures. SP-2888 is ideally suited for coating pipes to be used for slip bore/directional dril-
ling, due to its superior abrasion, impact and gouge-resistance properties.
3. The Southern Gas Corridor is a term used to describe planned infrastructure projects aimed at
improving the security and diversity of the EU’s energy supply, by bringing natural gas from
the Caspian Sea region to Europe.
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